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 1 
Lawrence v Fen Tigers: Controversies and  
Clarifications in the Law of Nuisance 
 
Introduction 
The line between what an owner or occupier is permitted to do in the 
enjoyment of his land and what his neighbour has to tolerate is a difficult one 
to draw. The continuing development and urbanization of modern society 
increases the tensions and challenges as the law seeks to strike a balance 
between competing interests. 
 
In Lawrence v Fen Tigers,
1
 the UKSC was confronted with no less than five 
issues: 
 prescription as a defence; 
 ‘coming to the nuisance’ as a defence; 
 relevance of the defendant’s activity in ascertaining the character of the 
locality; 
 relevance of planning permission in ascertaining the character of the 
locality; and 
 principles in determining if injunction or damages is the appropriate 
remedy. 
 
The fact that the High Court’s decision that there was nuisance was 
unanimously reversed by the Court of Appeal and finally restored by the 
Supreme Court itself serves to warn the reader that difficult and controversial 
issues are involved. 
 
Facts, parties, issues 
This case concerns a bungalow near
2
 a motorsports stadium and its adjoining 
motorcross track. The suit, for nuisance, was brought by Ms Lawrence (and her 
husband) against Mr Coventry (stadium owner from 2008, second defendant), 
Fen Tigers (the company which operated the motorcross track, first defendant), 
Motoland (lessee of the motorcross track, third defendant), Terence Waters 
(joint owner of the motorcross track, fourth defendant)
3
 and James Waters (son 
of Terence Waters and previous owner of stadium, sixth defendant). 
 
In 2008, following complaints from the plaintiffs, the local authority served 
abatement notices under the Environmental Protection Act 1990
4
 on Mr 
Coventry and Motoland. Protracted negotiations resulted in abatement works 
being carried out. The works, which reduced but did not eliminate the noise, 
                                                        
1
 [2014] UKSC 13; [2014] 2 WLR 433. 
2 Less than a kilometre away. 
3
 The other joint owner, Anthony Morley, was fifth defendant. 
4 In Singapore, the Environmental Protection and Management Act, cap 94A, 2002 
Rev Ed. 
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 2 
satisfied
5
 the authority but not the plaintiffs. The latter commenced 
proceedings. 
 
In the first proceeding,
6
 the High Court held that there was nuisance for which 
various defendants (but not the landlords) were responsible and awarded 
damages and injunctive relief. Mr Coventry and Motoland appealed. The Court 
of Appeal in Coventry v Lawrence
7
 reversed the High Court’s decision, holding 
that there was no nuisance.
8
 The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which had to deal with the five issues mentioned above. 
 
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. In a nutshell, the court expounded on 
the law on each of the issues and decided that: 
- the defences of prescription9 and coming to the nuisance10 did not 
avail as the elements were not satisfied on the facts; 
- the defendant’s activity is relevant in determining the character of 
the locality and so is the presence of planning permission (though to 
a much lesser degree) and, on the facts, there was nuisance; and 
- the trial judge’s order of injunction should be restored though the 
respondents were free to seek damages in lieu. 
 
Prescription 
The first issue was whether a defendant landowner could acquire a common 
law
11
 prescription right to carry on an activity which amounts to a nuisance to 
his neighbour.  
 
The trial judge, Judge Seymour, had held that as a matter of law there was no 
prescriptive right to emit noise if to do so would otherwise amount to 
actionable nuisance. He held, further, that in any case the use had to be 
continuous. In the Court of Appeal, Lewison LJ
12
 was of the view that it is 
possible to obtain such a prescriptive right. 
                                                        
5
 The council official’s view was that, after the attenuation works, the activities do not 
produce noise which is a nuisance under the Act but might still amount to a private 
nuisance: at [129], [207]. 
6
 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2011] EWHC 360, QB, [2011] 4 All ER 1314.  
7
 [2012] 1 WLR 2127. 
8
 The reason was that where planning permission had the effect of the changing the 
character of the locality, then whether an activity constituted a nuisance is to be 
decided against the background of the changed character. 
9
 On the facts, the defence did not avail as the respondents failed to establish that their 
activities created a nuisance over the 20 year period. 
10
 On the facts, the appellants used the property for the same purposes as their 
predecessors, so the defence did not avail. 
11
 A prescription right can also be granted by statute, as is common as regards noise 
caused by air navigation, such as, in Singapore, the Air Navigation Act, cap 6, 1985 
Rev Ed. 
12
 [2012] 1 WLR 2127 at [88] – [91]. 
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The Supreme Court held that the right to commit what would otherwise be a 
nuisance by noise is capable of being a prescriptive right. Lord Neuberger, with 
whom the other law lords agreed,
13
 had little difficulty in concluding that on 
both principle and policy,
14
 the right to carry on an activity which results in 
noise is capable of being an easement.
15
 To establish a common law 
prescription right, a person has to show at least 20 years enjoyment as of right, 
that is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’, meaning not by force, nor stealth nor 
with the licence of the owner.
16
 
 
His lordship acknowledged the three problems suggested in Clerk and 
Lindsell
17
: 
 that the 20 years can only run when the noise amounts to a nuisance; 
 the right acquired, that is the level of noise tolerated during the 20 years; 
and  
 how much (if any) more noise should be tolerated. 
 
His lordship’s answer to the first two problems is that these were practical 
problems which the defendant faces as he seeks to present his case; but that is 
not reason enough to deny the possibility of a prescription right. His answer to 
the third problem appears to be that the dominant owner cannot emit ‘a greater 
amount’18 of noise than during the 20 years, although it is not clear how that is 
to be measured. 
 
Lord Neuberger was also of the view that the 20 years use does not have to be 
continuous.
19
 
 
‘Coming to the nuisance’ 
Lord Neuberger, with whom the other judges agreed on this point, affirmed the 
long-established position in clear terms:
20
 
 
‘… where the claimant in nuisance uses her property for essentially the 
same purposes as that for which it has been used by her predecessors 
since before the alleged nuisance started…, the defence of coming to the 
nuisance must fail.’ 
 
                                                        
13
 None of the other judges added anything on this point. 
14
 At [34]. 
15
 See especially [28] and [41]. 
16
 Per Lord Walker in R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2012] 2 
AC 70 at para 20, cited with approval by Lord Neuberger in the instant case at [31]. 
17
 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 20
th
 ed (2010) at para 20-85. 
18
 At [39]. 
19
 At [37], noting the view expressed in Carr v Foster (1842) 3 QB 581 at 586-588 
that an interruption of 7 years might not destroy the claim of prescription. 
20
 At [51]. 
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Nuisance, after all, is a property-based tort, and so the right to allege a nuisance 
should ‘run with the land’.21 His lordship noted, obiter, that it ‘may well be’ a 
defence that the claimant came to the nuisance where the claimant changed the 
use of her land or built on her land.
22
 
 
Lord Neuberger made the interesting comment
23
 that perhaps the matter could 
and should be resolved by treating the defendant’s pre-existing activity as part 
of the character of the neighbourhood. 
 
Relevance of defendants’ activities 
The Court of Appeal had overturned the High Court’s decision on the ground 
that the judge had wrongly failed to take into account the defendant’s activities 
when considering the character of the locality. On this matter, Lord 
Neuberger’s view was that one starts with the proposition that the defendant’s 
activities are to be taken into account. This position, however, is to be qualified 
in that:
24
 
 
‘… to the extent that those activities are a nuisance to the claimant, they 
should be left out of the account when assessing the character of the 
locality or… notionally stripped out of the locality….’ 
 
Thus, to the extent that the defendant’s activities cause no nuisance,25 they 
should be regarded in the assessment and it would be ‘unrealistic, and indeed 
unfair’ to disregard them.26 
 
His lordship acknowledged that there may be an appearance of circularity in 
such an iterative process but felt that such circularity was more apparent than 
real. It is unclear to the reader how one can escape the circularity of the 
process. 
 
Further, he argued,
27
 even if there were circularity, such an approach was 
preferable to the two other approaches, namely, ignoring the activity altogether 
or to take into account the activity without modification. The first approach 
could be unfair to the defendant whilst the second approach would mean that 
                                                        
21
 At [52]. He added: ‘It would also seem odd if a defendant was no longer liable for a 
nuisance owing to the fact that the identity of his neighbour had changed, even though 
the use of his neighbour’s property remained unchanged.’ 
22
 At [58]. 
23
 At [55]. 
24
 At [65]. 
25 An alternative formulation could be that the defendant’s activity, to the extent that 
it is indisputably not a nuisance, should be taken into account in ascertaining the 
character of the locality. 
26
 At [66]. 
27
 At [73]. 
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the nuisance claim would rarely be successful (and would be unfair to the 
claimant). 
 
Lord Carnwath
28
 analysed the issue differently. In his view, an existing activity 
can clearly be taken into account if it is ‘part of the established pattern of use’ 
and noted that in Rushmer v Polsue & Alferi
29
 the defendants’ activities ‘at 
their previous level’ were accepted as part of the established pattern. This 
distinction between a new activity and an intensified activity is useful – a new 
activity does not form part of the character of the locality whilst for an 
intensified activity, the activity at its previous level of intensity, does form part 
of the character. 
 
It remains to be seen which of the two approaches will find favour with future 
courts. This writer finds the pragmatism of Lord Carnwath’s approach 
appealing. 
 
Relevance of planning permission 
We come now to the subject of planning permission, which Lord Carnwath 
thought
30
 was the most difficult problem raised in the appeal. Lord Neuberger, 
whose views on the subject were endorsed by Lords Sumption, Mance and 
Clarke said:
31
 
 
… it seems wrong in principle that, through the grant of a planning 
permission, a planning authority should be able to deprive a property-
owner of a right to object to what would otherwise be a nuisance, 
without providing her with compensation… 
 
Hence, the fact of planning permission is ‘normally of no assistance’32 though 
there will be some occasions where the terms of a planning permission may be 
of ‘some relevance’33. In his view:34  
 
... the existence and terms of the permission are not irrelevant… but in 
many cases they will be of little, or even no, evidential value…. 
 
In similar vein, Lord Sumption thought
35
 that planning permission is of ‘very 
limited relevance’ and ‘may, at best, provide some evidence of the 
reasonableness’ of the use of the land. 
                                                        
28
 See also Lord Mance’s comments at [164] regarding new activities and intensified 
activities. 
29
 [1906] 1 Ch 234. 
30
 At [191]. 
31
 At [90]. 
32
 At [94]. 
33
 At [95]. 
34
 At [96]. He said further (at [89]) that the grant of planning permission removes a 
bar imposed by planning law but does not mean that the development is lawful. 
 6 
 
Lord Carnwath was much more sanguine about planning permission. He began 
with a survey of the development of planning law and the law of nuisance, 
where he observed
36
 that while planning law promotes the public interest, the 
law of nuisance protects the rights of individuals, and that they may pull in 
opposite directions. He then referred to the landmark cases in the field, in 
particular the Gillingham Docks case
37
 where Buckley J famously said: 
 
… planning permission is not a licence to commit nuisance…. However, 
a planning authority can, through its development plans and decisions, 
alter the character of a neighbourhood. 
 
Lord Carnwath then noted that the Gillingham proposition was endorsed by 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon in Hunter v Canary Wharf
38
 and by the Court of 
Appeal in Watson v Croft Promosport.
39
 
 
After reviewing the authorities, Lord Carnwath concluded that planning 
permission may be relevant in two ways: it may be evidence of the relative 
importance of the permitted activity as part of the pattern of uses, and where 
planning permission includes a detailed framework of conditions governing the 
use, the framework may provide a ‘useful starting point or benchmark’ for the 
court’s consideration. In other words, planning permission may indicate that 
the activity is within the character of the locality, and compliance with the 
authority’s conditions may indicate that the intensity of the activity complained 
of did not go beyond the acceptable or tolerable level. 
 
It is observed that there is a parallel between using compliance with the 
planning authority’s conditions as a gauge for whether there is nuisance and 
using industry standard as an indicator of the standard of care in the tort of 
negligence. Such an approach makes good sense. 
 
Regarding character of locality, his lordship remarked that ‘in exceptional 
cases a planning permission may be the result of a considered policy 
decision… leading to a fundamental change in the pattern of uses, which 
cannot sensibly be ignored in assessing the character of the area’  (emphasis 
added) and added that planning permission which involve a ‘strategic planning 
decision affected by considerations of public interest’40 or a ‘major 
development altering the character of the neighbourhood with wide 
consequential effects’41 may result in a change of the character of the locality. 
                                                                                                                                                              
35
 At [156]. 
36
 At [193] and [194] respectively. 
37
 Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock [1993] QB 343 at p 359. 
38
 [1997] AC 655 at p 772E. 
39
 [2009]3 All ER 249 
40
 Wheeler v Saunders [1996] Ch 19 at p 30, per Staughton LJ. 
41
 Ibid, at p 35, per Peter Gibson LJ. 
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Lord Neuberger, however, disliked the concepts of ‘strategic planning 
decision’ or ‘major development’ and thought they were a ‘recipe for 
uncertainty’.42   
 
For now, the view that planning permission
43
 is of little value in ascertaining 
the character of the locality holds sway; but the issue is a controversial one. If a 
planning authority had considered a new activity (especially a large project) 
very carefully and closely, and after consultation with all the relevant 
stakeholders, it would be quixotic to ignore the authority’s decision to approve 
the activity. 
 
Perhaps one could merge both approaches into a single proposition that 
planning permission provides only little evidence of the character of the 
locality save where there is a strategic planning decision or a major 
development. 
 
The appropriate remedy – injunction or damages 
We come to a very controversial and unsettled area in the law of nuisance.
44
 
Assuming nuisance is established, should the court award an injunction (which 
is what most claimants desire) or should it award damages instead (which is 
what defendants pray for)? 
 
The pre-Lawrence legal landscape appears to be as follows. The traditional 
approach is that, prima facie, an injunction would be granted. However, the 
court has the discretion to award damages instead of an injunction. For the 
exercise of this discretion, two different sets of tests have been applied. 
 
In Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting,
45
 Smith LJ laid down the 
following four requirements for an award of damages: 
- the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small, 
- the injury is capable of being estimated in money, 
- the injury can be adequately compensated by a small money 
payment, and 
- it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction. 
Clearly, it would not be easy to satisfy all four of the requirements. 
 
In contrast, in Colls v Home & Colonial Store,
46
 Lord MacNaghten thought 
Shelfer was unsatisfactory and expressed the view, obiter, that a court ought to 
incline to damages rather than injunction if: 
                                                        
42
 At [91]. 
43 Likewise, where a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development (or 
CLEUD) is issued by the planning authority, as was in the instant case. 
44
 Lord Clarke, at [171], regarded the remedies issue as the most important aspect of 
the case. 
45
 [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
46
 [1904] AC 179 at 193. 
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- the injury can fairly be compensated by money (even if the sum is 
substantial), and 
- the defendant had acted fairly and ‘not in an unneighbourly spirit’.47 
It is noted that this view relaxes the requirements and even suggests that upon 
their satisfaction the presumption is that damages is the remedy to award. 
 
Finally, it should be added that, as recently as 2009, the Court of Appeal in 
Watson v Croft Promo-Sport
48
 took the position that the public benefit of the 
defendant’s activity is not a sufficient reason for refusing an injunction.49 
 
The subject was dealt with at great length by the UKSC, especially by Lord 
Neuberger in his leading judgment. The rest of the judges, whilst agreeing with 
Lord Neuberger generally, disagreed on some points and added qualifiers. Lord 
Carnwath, however, viewed this aspect of the law quite differently from Lord 
Neuberger. The legal picture which emerges is a maze comprising the 
following possible principles or propositions: 
 
a) Prima facie, an injunction should be granted (Lord Neuberger50); 
 
b) The defendant bears the burden of showing why an injunction should 
not be given (Lord Neuberger
51
; Lord Clarke
52
 preferred to ‘reserve 
the question’), but it is incorrect to say that damages may only be 
awarded in ‘very exceptional circumstances’ (Lord Neuberger53); 
 
c) The power to award damages instead of an injunction involves a 
classic exercise of discretion and should be unfettered (Lords 
Neuberger
54
, Clarke
55
); 
 
d) In the exercise of this discretion, courts are guided by Shelfer,56 
Colls and also public interest, which includes the fact that planning 
                                                        
47
 In contrast, an injunction would be given if the defendant had acted in a ‘high-
handed’ manner, tried to ‘steal a march’ upon the plaintiff or tried to evade the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
48
 [2009] 3 All ER  249. 
49
 However, he accepted, at [51], that public benefit can be taken into account where 
the damage to the plaintiff is minimal. 
50
 At [101], [121]. 
51
 At [121]. 
52
 At [170]. 
53
 At [119]. 
54
 At [120]. 
55
 At [170]. 
56
 His lordship also remarked at [123] that even if not all four of the requirements are 
satisfied, it is still possible that an injunction may be granted. 
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permission had been given
57
 (Lords Neuberger
58
, Sumption
59
 and 
Carnwath
60
); 
 
e) However, the presence of planning permission does not raise a 
presumption against awarding an injunction (Lords Mance
61
, 
Carnwath
62
); 
 
f) In exercising its discretion, the court should keep an open mind; 
there should not be any inclination towards either injunction or 
damages, save that the burden is on the defendant (Lord Neuberger
63
, 
contra Lords Sumption and Clarke in (g) below); 
 
g) Damages are ordinarily an adequate remedy for nuisance (Lords 
Sumption
64
 and Clarke
65
; Lord Mance disagreeing
66
; contra Lord 
Neuberger in (f) above); 
 
h) Special importance should attach to the right to enjoy one’s home 
without disturbance, independently of financial considerations 
(Lords Mance
67
 and Carnwath
68
); and 
 
i) The approaches in the measurement of damages include: 
-  the traditional approach of fall in value, 
-  loss of amenity (Lords Neuberger
69
, Clarke
70
), and 
-  possibly a share in the defendant’s benefits or profits (Lord 
Clarke
71
; Lords Neuberger and Carnwath expressing reluctance
72
). 
 
The law regarding the appropriate remedy for nuisance is far from settled and 
the array of views and variations of views canvassed is quite baffling. 
                                                        
57
 Other factors include fact that defendant’s business has to be closed, loss of jobs, 
resource implications and benefit to the public: [124] – [126]. 
58
 At [121]-[126].  
59
 Obliquely at [158] – [159]. 
60
 At [245]. 
61
 At [167]. 
62
 At [246]. 
63
 At [122]. 
64
 At [161]. 
65
 At [171]. 
66
 At [168]. 
67
 At [168]. 
68
 At [247]. 
69
 At [128]. 
70
 At [172]. 
71
 At [173]. 
72
 At [131] and [248] respectively. Giving the plaintiff a share of the defendant’s 
benefit is a highly controversial matter: see eg the comments of Lord Carnwath at 
[248]. 
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Commenting how Shelfer is out of date and devised in a time when England 
was far less crowded and without a system of planning control, Lord Sumption 
remarked
73
 that ‘[t]he whole jurisprudence in this area will need one day to be 
reviewed by this court’. Observe also the hesitancy of Lord Clarke,74 who 
preferred to leave the law open on many of the sub-issues. 
 
In view of the above complexities and apprehensions, perhaps all that can be 
said with some confidence about this area of law is: 
 
1) English courts are now less reluctant than before to award damages 
instead of an injunction; 
 
2) In exercising its discretion, the court applies the tests in Shelfer and in 
Colls and also considers the factor of public interest, including the fact 
that planning permission had been given; and 
 
3) In deciding the measure of damages, the court considers the alternatives 
of fall in value, loss of amenity and, possibly, a share of the defendant’s 
benefit. 
 
The writer would add that it is surprising that there was no discussion in the 
UKSC judgment of the option of ordering the defendant to carry out 
attenuation or ameliorative works, as is common in the statutory nuisance 
regime.
75
  For example, under s 29 of Singapore’s Environmental Protection 
and Management Act,
76
 the Director-General of Environmental Protection may, 
if satisfied that noise is being or is likely to be emitted from any work place, 
issue a noise control notice. Action required under such a notice include the 
installation of noise control equipment and the erection of noise barriers. 
 
One would have thought that, in appropriate situations, courts would also make 
such an order since it facilitates the ideal solution of allowing the defendant to 
carry on his activity without disturbing the plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment of 
land.
77
 
 
Concluding remarks 
                                                        
73
 At [161].  
74
 At [170] – [173]. 
75 As is common in the UK Environmental Protection Act framework, which is 
discussed in some detail by the Court of Appeal in Coventry v Lawrence [2012] 1 
WLR 2127.  
76
 See also s 44 of the Environmental Public Health Act, cap 95, 2002 Rev Ed. 
77 The leading texts, such as Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (7th ed, 2013) at pp 447 
– 452) and Street on Torts, ed Witting (14th ed, 2015) at pp 466 – 469, do not suggest 
that such an order is available. 
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It has been said that ‘[t]here is no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law 
than that which surrounds the word nuisance’.78 The UKSC decision in 
Lawrence v Fen Tigers discusses several of the captious issues in the law of 
nuisance. Of particular difficulty and controversy are the relevance of planning 
permission
79
 in deciding whether an activity amounts to a nuisance and 
whether damages should be awarded instead of an injunction.  
 
With the heightened tensions and increasing competing interests in modern 
society, the endeavor to protect a home owner’s right to quiet enjoyment while 
respecting his neighbour’s right to carry on an activity (whether residential or 
commercial) which causes some disturbance but which confers benefit to the 
community has become extremely challenging. The difficulty is accentuated 
where planning permission had been granted.  
 
England’s apex court has yet to agree decisively how this delicate balance is to 
be achieved. It appears that the law is gravitating to a position where an owner 
or occupier of land is relegated to a lower level of enjoyment and that 
toleration of a greater degree of disturbance is but a vicissitude of modern 
living. 
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78
 WL Prosser and WP Keeton on Torts (5
th
 ed, 1984) at p 616. 
79 Where planning permission is involved, perhaps the aggrieved party should seek 
his remedy in administrative law rather than in the law of torts. 
